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ABSTRACT: We study moral judgments regarding budgetary slack made by partici-
pants at the end of a participative budgeting experiment in which an expectation for a
truthful budget was present. We find that participants who set budgets under a slack-
inducing pay scheme, and therefore built relatively high levels of budgetary slack,
judged significant budgetary slack to be unethical on average, whereas participants
who set budgets under a truth-inducing pay scheme did not. This suggests that the
slack-inducing pay scheme generated a moral frame by setting economic self-interest
against common social norms such as honesty or responsibility. We also find that
participants who scored high in traditional values and empathy on a pre-experiment
personality questionnaire JPI-R were more likely to judge significant budgetary slack
to be unethical. These results suggest that financial incentives play a role in determin-
ing the moral frame of the budgeting setting and that personal values play a role in
determining how individuals respond to that moral frame.
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INTRODUCTION
Budgetary slack is created when a subordinate understates their capabilities or the capabili-ties of a business unit in their budget.1 Budgetary slack may pose a moral dilemmabecause it allows a subordinate to extract excess resources through deceptive means, and
such behavior violates common social norms Merchant 1995 and basic standards of professional
conduct Davis et al. 2006. Consistent with the view that budgetary slack poses a moral dilemma,
prior studies have documented that some individuals judge budgetary slack to be unethical, and
this moral judgment causes them to reduce the slack in their budgets Douglas and Wier 2000;
Stevens 2002. Prior experimental studies have also documented, however, that moral judgments
regarding budgetary slack are highly variable Stevens 2002; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008. This
variability in moral judgment, which is characteristic of moral dilemmas Thorne 2000, remains
unexplained. We address this gap in the literature by examining the effect of pay scheme and
personal values on moral judgments regarding budgetary slack.
Moral judgment describes the determination of whether a course of action is morally right or
wrong O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005.2 Recent experimental findings suggest that further inves-
tigation of moral judgments regarding budgetary slack is warranted. Evans et al. 2001 found that
participants sacrifice wealth to provide honest or partially honest cost reports and do not lie more
as the payoff to lying increases. Similarly, Stevens 2002 found that participants sacrifice wealth
to reduce the amount of slack in their production budget. Stevens 2002 also found that budgetary
slack was negatively related to participants’ moral judgments regarding budgetary slack, and these
moral judgments were invariant to the amount of information the superior possessed regarding
production potential. Rankin et al. 2008, however, found that requiring a factual assertion about
cost did not reduce slack in the cost budget when a participant superior could reject the budget,
and stated that this evidence supported the view that budgeting is essentially devoid of ethical
consideration. Consistent with this view, Schatzberg and Stevens 2008 found no evidence that
moral judgments reduced budgetary slack in a setting in which budgetary slack and low effort
gave the subordinate a larger share of the available surplus, and participant superiors allowed
subordinates to set relatively high budgetary slack to induce high effort from the subordinates.
These experimental findings raise a number of important research questions. While results in
Evans et al. 2001 and Stevens 2002 suggest that moral judgments affect self-interested behav-
ior in participative budgeting settings, results in Rankin et al. 2008 and Schatzberg and Stevens
2008 downplay the potential effect of such moral judgments. The experimental settings in
Rankin et al. 2008 and Schatzberg and Stevens 2008, however, appear to have minimized the
potential for a moral dilemma to arise. First, no expectation of a truthful budget was conveyed to
participants in the instructions. Second, participants formed anonymous superior/subordinate pairs
and communication was limited to budget information via computer terminals. Third, the budget
determined the split of a surplus amount and the relative share of the surplus was publicly
disclosed to both parties. These features likely caused participants to view the participative bud-
geting setting in a strategic, economic frame rather than in a moral frame Salterio and Webb
2006.
1 The subordinate may understate his/her capabilities in his/her budget by overstating cost estimates e.g., the manager of
a cost center, understating revenue estimates e.g., the manager of a revenue center, or understating production
estimates e.g., a producer or supervisor of a production line.
2 Moral judgment is typically considered to be one step in the process of moral decision-making. Rest’s 1986 model
views moral decision-making as involving four steps: identifying the moral nature of a given situation moral aware-
ness, deciding whether a course of action is morally right or wrong moral judgment, establishing moral intent moral
intent, and engaging in moral action moral behavior.
88 Hobson, Mellon, and Stevens
Behavioral Research In Accounting Volume 23, Number 1, 2011
American Accounting Association
We develop hypotheses regarding the effect of pay scheme and personal values on moral
judgments regarding budgetary slack and test our hypotheses using data from the budgeting
experiment reported in Stevens 2002 and other data not reported in his original study. We find
Stevens’ 2002 experimental setting to be ideal for our study. First, his instructions contained
mundane realism and communicated an expectation for a truthful budget. Second, Stevens 2002
gathered a moral judgment regarding budgetary slack in his exit questionnaire, and this moral
judgment was negatively associated with budgetary slack created under a slack-inducing pay
scheme. Third, Stevens 2002 gathered but did not report data from a group of participants who
were given a truth-inducing pay scheme. Thus, we are able to include data from both pay scheme
groups to examine pay scheme effects. Fourth, Stevens 2002 gave participants in his study the
Jackson Personality Inventory-Revised questionnaire Jackson 1994, so we are able to examine
the effects of personal values. Fifth, student producers interacted with an experimenter manager,
so distributional fairness concerns were minimized.3 Finally, Stevens’ 2002 design incorporated
an unambiguous prediction from Agency Theory and a competing prediction from moral theory,
which increases the potential for economic theory-building Brown et al. 2009.
We find that participants who set budgets under the slack-inducing pay scheme judged sig-
nificant budgetary slack to be unethical on average, whereas participants who set budgets under
the truth-inducing pay scheme did not. This pay scheme effect is not driven by justification or
hindsight bias Sligo and Stirton 1998, as participants given the slack-inducing pay scheme built
significantly more budgetary slack during the experiment than participants given the truth-
inducing pay scheme 41.1 percent versus 3.6 percent of expected production in the final period.
In addition, this pay scheme effect is not driven by differences in perceived moral obligation, as
both pay scheme groups agreed on average to a statement in the exit questionnaire that the firm
desired a budget that reflected expected production. In fact, the truth-inducing pay scheme group
agreed marginally more strongly to this statement, perhaps because the financial incentives of their
pay scheme supported the statement. Thus, we conclude that the slack-inducing pay scheme
generated a moral frame by setting economic self-interest against common social norms such as
honesty or responsibility.
Based upon theory and empirical findings in the literature, we examine three personal values
that are likely to increase moral reasoning regarding budgetary slack: Traditional Values, Respon-
sibility, and Empathy. Controlling for pay scheme, we find that participants who scored high on
the Traditional Values scale of the Jackson Personality Inventory-Revised Jackson 1994, hereafter
JPI-R were more likely to judge significant budgetary slack to be unethical on average. Since
traditional values are inconsistent with a utilitarian or “relativist” value orientation, this result is
consistent with prior empirical research finding a negative relation between moral judgment and
relativism Forsyth 1980, 1992. We also find that participants who scored high on the Empathy
scale were more likely to judge significant budgetary slack to be unethical on average. This result
is consistent with theory suggesting that empathy enhances moral judgment under a moral di-
lemma by allowing individuals to look beyond narrow self-interest Smith 1759/1966; Eisenberg
et al. 1994; Eisenberg 2000. In an analysis of the slack-inducing pay scheme group alone, we find
that the Traditional Values and Empathy variables explain the increase in moral judgment under
the slack-inducing pay scheme. These results suggest that financial incentives play a role in
3 In experiments where the decisions of one group of participants affect the pay of another group of participants e.g.,
Hannan et al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2008; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008, distributional fairness can become a significant
factor in judgments and decisions. Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010 suggest that distributional fairness concerns can be
reduced by making the relative distribution of earnings opaque to participants. See the discussion of the potential
confound of distributional fairness in experimental studies of moral decision making in Salterio and Webb 2006.
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determining the moral frame of the budgeting setting and that personal values play a role in
determining how individuals respond to that moral frame.
This research advances our understanding of the moral content of participative budgeting
settings. Budgetary slack has traditionally been viewed as an organizational and behavioral issue,
but researchers have begun to view budgetary slack as an ethical issue Salterio and Webb 2006.
This evolving view is due in large part to empirical evidence that some managers and experiment
participants judge budgetary slack to be unethical, and this moral judgment causes them to reduce
the slack in their budgets Douglas and Wier 2000; Stevens 2002. To date, however, there is a
lack of research examining why some individuals judge budgetary slack to be unethical. Recent
experimental evidence suggests that budgetary slack may not raise moral concerns when partici-
pants observe high budgetary slack in others Schatzberg and Stevens 2008 or budgetary slack is
part of a strategic game that determines the split of a surplus amount between the subordinate and
a participant superior Rankin et al. 2008; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008. The results reported
here, therefore, provide new and useful insights regarding the features of the participative budget-
ing setting that may raise moral concerns.
This research also advances our understanding of the role of economic incentives and per-
sonal values in moral reasoning within the organization. Our study suggests that by setting eco-
nomic self-interest against common norms for honesty and responsibility, a slack-inducing pay
scheme generates a moral dilemma. This moral dilemma generates a moral frame in the subordi-
nate that engages moral reasoning. Further, our study suggests that personal values determine how
the subordinate will respond to a given moral frame. Within business organizations, duties and
obligations frequently arise that conflict with economic self-interest and generate moral dilemmas
Jansen and Von Glinow 1985; Bowie and Duska 1990; Beauchamp and Bowie 2004; Bicchieri
2006. Thus, our results are likely to generalize to other settings within the organization besides
the participative budgeting setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we develop the hypotheses that we
test in this study. Next, we present our experimental method and results. We conclude by discuss-
ing the implications of our results.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Participative budgeting and the problem of budgetary slack have been studied extensively in
the accounting literature Argyris 1952; Onsi 1973; Umapathy 1987. Subordinate participation in
the budgeting process is driven by environmental and task uncertainty, task interdependence, and
superior-subordinate information asymmetry Shields and Shields 1998. The main purpose of
participative budgeting, from an organizational perspective, is for the superior to gain information
from the subordinate that is useful to plan and coordinate production, reduce uncertainty, and
thereby increase profitability. Thus, participative budgeting is an organizational solution to an
information asymmetry problem, and there is potential gain to the organization if the subordinate
truthfully reveals his or her expected performance in the budget Stevens 2002; Salterio and Webb
2006; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008.
The same conditions that make participative budgeting valuable to the organization, however,
also provide the subordinate with an opportunity to gain at the expense of the organization. In
particular, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry allow the subordinate to profit
by presenting a distorted picture of his or her capabilities in the budget Merchant 1995. When a
subordinate creates budgetary slack, he misrepresents his capabilities to make the budget easier to
attain, and thereby uses his superior knowledge to unfair advantage Douglas and Wier 2000.
When a subordinate subsequently surpasses the budget, he typically receives increased remunera-
tion or perquisites. Budgetary slack, with its potential to mislead the superior and transfer re-
sources to the subordinate, may therefore generate a moral dilemma that requires moral judgment
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on the part of the subordinate Stevens 2002; Salterio and Webb 2006; Schatzberg and Stevens
2008.4 Below, we develop hypotheses predicting that moral judgments regarding budgetary slack
will be affected by pay scheme and personal values.
The Effect of Pay Scheme
To develop our first hypothesis predicting a pay scheme effect on moral judgments regarding
budgetary slack, we reference theory relating to framing effects in social norm theory and moral
philosophy. According to Bicchieri 2006, the existence of a social norm depends on a sufficient
number of people believing that the social norm exists, that it pertains to a given setting, and that
a significant number of people will follow it in similar settings. Accordingly, a social norm for
narrow self-interest could arise and persist in some settings. In general, however, the purpose of
social norms is to control self-interest in settings where there is a potential conflict between
self-interest and pro-social behavior. Social norms e.g., fairness, reciprocity, cooperation, honesty,
and promise-keeping exist precisely because it might not be in the individual’s immediate self-
interest to behave in a socially beneficial way in a given setting.
Bicchieri 2006 emphasizes that a social norm must be activated before it can be applied to
a given setting. For a social norm to be activated, however, a person must infer from the various
cues in the setting what the appropriate behavior is, what they should expect others to do, and
what they are expected to do themselves Bicchieri 2006, 59. Thus, attention to cues plays a
critical role in social norm activation, and attending to different cues may cause individuals to
frame the same setting very differently. This emphasis on cue processing and framing has its
counterpart in the moral philosophy literature. For example, Rest’s 1986 model of moral
decision-making suggests that an individual must first interpret a decision setting as having a
moral frame moral awareness before deciding which course of action is morally right moral
judgment. Other models of moral decision making also imply that a given situation must generate
a moral frame before a moral judgment is made e.g., Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell
1986; Trevino 1986; Jones 1991; Forsyth 1992. Economists have also begun to recognize the
importance of framing effects in designing and interpreting experimental studies Samuelson
2005.5
This discussion suggests that the cues surrounding the budgetary slack decision are instru-
mental in generating a moral frame leading to moral reasoning. We argue that a slack-inducing pay
scheme will be more likely than a truth-inducing pay scheme to generate a moral frame leading to
moral reasoning because it sets economic self-interest against common social norms. Slack-
inducing pay schemes, which are common in practice, motivate the subordinate to create budget-
ary slack by paying a bonus for performance that surpasses the budget Stevens 2002. Thus, a
slack-inducing pay scheme will likely activate moral reasoning by causing the subordinate to
focus on the conflict between his economic self-interest and his obligation to be truthful in the
budget. In contrast, a truth-inducing pay scheme will be less likely to activate moral reasoning
because it sets economic self-interest in harmony with common social norms. Thus, we predict
that subordinates who set budgets under a slack-inducing pay scheme will be more likely to judge
significant budgetary slack to be unethical on average. This leads to our first hypothesis:
4 This discussion of budgetary slack assumes a production or sales budget. In the context of a cost budget, the subordinate
would build slack into the budget by overstating the expected costs for a given period. This discussion also ignores the
literature in organizational slack, which often suggests that organizational slack can be useful to absorb fluctuations in
an uncertain operating environment Cyert and March 1992. While we do not discount this issue, our experimental
study focuses on the case in which budgetary slack negatively affects the organization.
5 In his review of economic theory and experimental economics, Samuelson 2005 states that experimental settings are
likely to raise models of behavior in subjects’ minds. He calls these models “experimental game protocols.”
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H1: Subordinates who set budgets under a slack-inducing pay scheme will be more likely to
judge significant budgetary slack to be unethical than subordinates who set budgets
under a truth-inducing pay scheme.
The Effects of Personal Values
To develop our hypotheses predicting the effects of personal values on moral judgments
regarding budgetary slack, we reference moral decision-making theory and related theory in moral
philosophy and moral psychology. Consistent with Rokeach 1973, we define personal values as
an individual’s prescriptive beliefs concerning the desirability of modes of conduct or end-states.
Thus, personal values are similar to personal preferences in economic theory. Economic theory
typically assumes, however, that personal preferences only include wealth and leisure see Stevens
and Thevaranjan 2010 for an exception.6 Personal values, as described in moral philosophy and
moral psychology, are more comprehensive and individualistic. In particular, personal values can
include honesty, integrity, fairness, responsibility, and empathy concern for others. These per-
sonal values are the result of personal and cultural experiences and can vary across individuals due
to differences in such experiences. Further, personal values can develop over time as a result of
“the process of maturation” Glover et al. 1997.
Moral decision-making theory suggests that moral judgment can be affected by personal
values. For example, models in Kohlberg 1969, Rest 1986, Trevino 1986, and Jones 1991
stress the role of moral development in establishing a person’s moral capacity or ability to respond
to a moral dilemma. In contrast, models in Ferrell and Gresham 1985 and Hunt and Vitell 1986
assume the pre-existence of personal values that affect moral judgment. Theoretically, personal
values are not affected by short-term contextual factors Thorne 2000. Thus, theory suggests that
personal values reflect the long-term potential for an individual to form a sufficient moral judg-
ment under a given moral setting or moral frame.
A consistent result in the empirical literature is that individuals who reject moral rules in favor
of a more “relativist” approach exhibit lower moral judgment see Forsyth 1992. In their review
of the empirical ethical decision-making literature, O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005, 400 empha-
size this result and call on researchers to examine additional personal values that affect moral
judgment. Based upon theory and empirical findings in the literature, we examine three personal
values that are likely to increase moral reasoning regarding budgetary slack: Traditional Values,
Responsibility, and Empathy. We explain our expectations for these three personal values below.
Traditional Values
Individuals tend to use a given value orientation when faced with a moral dilemma Glover et
al. 1997. If an individual uses a deontological value orientation, then he/she will rely primarily on
universal moral rules or social norms in determining the course of action that is morally right. If,
on the other hand, an individual uses a utilitarian value orientation, then he/she will rely primarily
on assessments of the maximum utility outcome in determining the course of action that is morally
right. Because of its reliance on absolute moral rules, deontological value orientation is associated
with “traditional values.” Because of its rejection of absolute moral rules, in contrast, utilitarian
value orientation is associated with “relativism.”
6 Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010 present a principal-agent model where the agent possesses some level of moral
sensitivity that causes him disutility if he provides less than an agreed-upon level of effort. They compare the “moral
solution” that emerges in their model with the traditional incentive solution that is required when the agent is assumed
to have zero moral sensitivity. They conclude that adding moral sensitivity increases the descriptive, prescriptive, and
pedagogical usefulness of the principal-agent model.
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The empirical literature suggests that a utilitarian or “relativist” value orientation is negatively
related to moral decision-making O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005. In particular, relativism has
been found to reduce moral judgment Forsyth 1980, 1992, decrease sensitivity to ethical issues
Shaub et al. 1993, and increase the willingness of professional managers to engage in budgetary
slack and other budget gaming behavior Douglas and Wier 2000. In our study of the determi-
nants of moral reasoning regarding budgetary slack, however, we focus on personal values that are
likely to increase moral reasoning regarding budgetary slack. Given moral theory suggesting that
a deontological value orientation leads individuals to rely on universal moral rules or “traditional
values,” and budgetary slack tends to conflict with such rules and values, we predict that a
personal value for traditional values will increase moral reasoning regarding budgetary slack.
Thus, we test the following personal value hypothesis:
H2: Subordinates who value traditional values will be more likely to judge significant bud-
getary slack to be unethical.
Responsibility
Some individuals value being responsible and following through on their commitments Jack-
son 1994. If a subordinate sees a truthful budget as part of his/her responsibility to the superior,
and values following through on commitments, then he/she is more likely to view budgetary slack
as a wrongful act. This is consistent with arguments in Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010 that an
agent is likely to feel some level of disutility guilt or regret for failing to follow through on a
previous agreement with the principal. Further, this is consistent with Stevens’ 2002 evidence of
a negative relation between a personal value for responsibility and budgetary slack. Given this
theoretical support and empirical evidence, we predict that a personal value for responsibility will
increase moral reasoning regarding budgetary slack. Thus, we test the following personal value
hypothesis:
H3: Subordinates who value responsibility will be more likely to judge significant budgetary
slack to be unethical.
Empathy
In moral philosophy, concern for others is a key underpinning of moral reasoning Glover et
al. 1997. In his lesser-known treatise, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith 1759/1966
addressed the fundamental question of moral philosophy: “Why do we regard certain actions or
intentions with approval and others with disapproval?” Smith 1759/1966 developed an answer to
this question based on the ability of individuals to judge and act from the perspective of an
“impartial observer.” In particular, Smith 1759/1966 argued that moral judgments, both with
respect to one’s own conduct and that of others, require an individual to enter into the situations
of others and imagine the circumstances and “passions” that gave rise to their behavior. He
asserted that individuals approve of a given behavior if, as an impartial spectator, they can “sym-
pathize” with the sentiments and motives that directed the behavior. Thus, sympathy or empathy
formed the foundation of Smith’s 1759/1966 moral system.
Recently, researchers in moral psychology have asserted that judgments of right and wrong
require a capacity for empathy, and that psychopaths and other moral degenerates lack this capac-
ity Deigh 1995; Gordon 1995. Eisenberg et al. 1994 define empathy as an affective response
that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition.
Empathy is associated with other-oriented motivation, and this motivation is a requirement for
altruistic behavior Eisenberg 2000. Thus, empathy can be viewed as a moral emotion that helps
individuals overcome self-interest or egoism Deigh 1995. Individuals who possess empathy will,
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therefore, be more likely to look beyond economic self-interest when that self-interest conflicts
with common social norms. Given the supporting theory in moral psychology and moral philoso-
phy, we predict that a personal value for empathy will increase moral reasoning regarding bud-
getary slack. Thus, we test the following personal value hypothesis:
H4: Subordinates who value empathy will be more likely to judge significant budgetary slack
to be unethical.
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
We test our hypotheses using the experimental setting in Stevens 2002. We find his experi-
ment to be useful because it utilizes methods from both experimental economics and behavioral
psychology. Consistent with experimental economics, participants were paid privately in cash and
multiple decision periods were included to reduce the influence of learning effects. These features
are important in experimental tests of the effects of economic incentives on judgments Smith
1991; Smith and Walker 1993; Moser 1998. Consistent with behavioral psychology, the experi-
ment contained mundane realism in that the instructions described a production setting in which
participants produced units and set budgets for a production company. This feature is important in
experimental tests of the effects of personal values and perceptions Haynes and Kachelmeier
1998. Finally, the instructions emphasized that the company desired a truthful budget and the
experimental procedures carefully guarded the privacy of the participants’ decisions.7 These fea-
tures are important in experimental tests of moral reasoning Stevens 2002.
Participants and Experimental Task
The data for this study came from 104 student volunteers enrolled in upper-level accounting
courses at a large midwestern university in the United States. Our sample includes 52 participants
who were included in Stevens’ 2002 original study of budgetary slack and 52 participants not
reported in his study. Twenty-four experimental sessions were conducted over a four-week period.
In each experimental session, up to five participants came to a computer laboratory and performed
a computerized experimental task in private cubicles. The computerized production task required
participants to translate two-digit numbers into letters using the ASCII numeric code 65  A, 66
 B, 67  C,…,90  Z. The successful translation of six numbers into letters constituted one
unit of production. Participants performed the production task and submitted budgets to an ex-
perimenter who played the role of the manager at a production company. Each experimental
session included two training periods and five production periods and lasted approximately one
hour. In each production period, participants entered a budget and forecast of production into the
computer, performed the production task for three minutes, and then received a summary of their
earnings for the period.
The day before their scheduled experimental session, participants came to the computer labo-
ratory to complete the Jackson Personality Inventory-Revised Jackson 1994. The JPI-R consists
of 300 true/false questions that measure 15 personality scales or attributes.8 This personality
questionnaire has been widely used for personal and career counseling, employment screening,
7 Procedures that were used to carefully guard the privacy of participants’ decisions included the use of private cubicles,
un-networked personal computers, and random identification codes in place of names.
8 The 15 scales in the JPI-R include Complexity, Breadth of Interest, Innovation, Tolerance, Empathy, Anxiety, Coopera-
tiveness, Sociability, Social Confidence, Energy Level, Social Astuteness, Risk Taking, Organization, Traditional Values,
and Responsibility. For each personality scale in the JPI-R, ten questions are designed so that true is consistent with the
trait and ten questions are designed so that false is consistent with the trait. All 300 true/false questions are also
randomized so that the participants cannot perceive what particular traits are being measured.
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and research Jackson 1994. Participants were paid $3 for completing the JPI-R along with their
other earnings, which averaged approximately $9, at the end of the experimental session.
Dependent Variable
For our dependent variable, we use Stevens’ 2002 measure of moral judgment regarding
budgetary slack. This measure is similar to other studies of moral judgment in the ethics literature
e.g., Kaplan 2001; Chung and Monroe 2003; Kaplan et al. 2007. On the exit questionnaire,
which included 25 items, participants responded to the following statement: “To have set the
budget significantly below the forecast of production would have been unethical.” The response to
this question ranged from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree” with 4 labeled as “neutral.”
Pay Scheme Manipulation
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two pay scheme conditions.9 Half of the
participants were given a “slack-inducing” pay scheme that paid a flat salary plus a bonus for each
unit of production beyond the budget. In particular, the slack-inducing pay scheme paid the
following each period:
P = $1.35 + $0.05A − B, if A B ,
P = $1.35, if A B ,
where P, A, and B represent the pay, actual units produced, and participant’s pre-set budget for the
production period, respectively. This pay scheme is slack-inducing because it motivates the sub-
ordinate to set the budget at 0. Stevens 2002 included the 52 participants in the slack-inducing
pay scheme group in his original study of budgetary slack.
The other half of the participants were given a “truth-inducing” pay scheme that paid a bonus
of $0.10 for each unit in the budget, a penalty of $0.15 for each unit of production below the
budget if production fell short of the budget, and a bonus of $0.05 for each unit of production
above the budget if production surpassed the budget. In particular, the truth-inducing pay scheme
paid the following each period:
P = $0.10B + $0.05A − B, if A B ,
P = $0.10B + $0.15A − B, if A B .
This pay scheme is truth-inducing because it motivates the subordinate to set the budget at
expected production i.e., forecasted production. Stevens 2002 did not include the 52 partici-
pants in the truth-inducing pay scheme group in his original study. While truth-inducing pay
schemes are rarely found in free-market economies Kaplan and Atkinson 1998, they are com-
monly used in experimental studies of pay scheme incentives e.g., Chow et al. 1988, Waller 1988,
Libby 2003. We find it useful to implement a truth-inducing pay scheme in our study to examine
9 The experiment also manipulated information asymmetry between the experimenter manager and the participant sub-
ordinates at three levels. In the “No Information Asymmetry” condition, subordinates exited their cubicle before each
production period to give the experimenter manager a report containing the current period budget and the prior period
budgets and production levels. In the “Low Information Asymmetry” condition, subordinates gave the manager a report
containing only the current period budget and prior period budgets. In the “High Information Asymmetry” condition,
subordinates did not interact with the manager during the production periods, i.e., budget choices and production
outcomes were completely anonymous each period. With both pay schemes included, we find no relation between the
information asymmetry manipulation and moral judgments regarding budgetary slack, consistent with results reported in
Stevens 2002 with the slack-inducing pay scheme only. Thus, we ignore this manipulation in our study and merge the
three information asymmetry conditions.
Determinants of Moral Judgments Regarding Budgetary Slack 95
Behavioral Research In Accounting Volume 23, Number 1, 2011
American Accounting Association
the effect of financial incentives on moral judgments regarding budgetary slack. In addition,
contrasting moral judgments under a truth-inducing pay scheme and a slack-inducing pay scheme
may help explain why truth-inducing pay schemes are rarely used in practice.
Measures of Personal Values
We utilize three personality scales from the JPI-R to test our hypotheses regarding the effects
of personal values on moral judgments regarding budgetary slack: Traditional Values, Responsi-
bility, and Empathy. Each scale is measured by the response to 20 true/false questions from the
JPI-R, so potential scores on each scale range from 0 to 20 see footnote 8. The Traditional
Values scale assesses the degree to which an individual values traditional norms and beliefs, and
is the opposite of relativism Jackson 1994. The Responsibility scale assesses the degree to which
an individual feels an abstract moral obligation to other people and to society at large, and is the
opposite of negligence Jackson 1994. The Empathy scale assesses the degree to which an indi-
vidual identifies or sympathizes with other people and their problems, and is the opposite of
indifference Jackson 1994.
Control Variables
Based on intuition and prior empirical findings, we include three control variables in our
model of moral judgments regarding budgetary slack: Moral Obligation, Senior Year in Business
School, and Justification. We use an item from the exit questionnaire as a measure of perceived
Moral Obligation. As mentioned in the introduction, the instructions to the experiment commu-
nicated an expectation for a truthful budget. In particular, the instructions stated, “Alpha would
like its workers to produce as many units as they can and to set their budgets at their forecast of
production.”10 This statement was repeated in the exit questionnaire and participants responded to
the statement on a Likert scale from 1  “strongly disagree” to 7  “strongly agree” with 4
labeled as “neutral.” We use the response to this statement as a measure of Moral Obligation
perceived by the participant during the experiment, and predict a positive relation between this
control variable and moral judgments regarding budgetary slack.11
Prior research has shown that time in business school can affect moral reasoning O’Fallon
and Butterfield 2005. In particular, Tse and Au 1997 found that senior business school students
in New Zealand tended to be less ethical in their moral judgments than did junior business
students. Thus, we include Senior Year in Business School as a control variable in our study. The
exit questionnaire revealed that 1.9 percent 2 of the participants were sophomores, 28.8 percent
30 were juniors, 67 percent 70 were seniors, and 1.9 percent 2 were graduate students. Thus,
we code this control variable as 0 for sophomores and juniors and 1 for seniors and graduate
students. Based on prior results Tse and Au 1997, we predict a negative relation between this
control variable and moral judgments regarding budgetary slack.
Finally, prior research has shown that justification or hindsight bias can affect moral reasoning
Sligo and Stirton 1998. The moral judgments regarding budgetary slack used in our study were
made by participants at the end of an experiment in which they had built various levels of
budgetary slack over five production periods. Thus, those who built relatively high levels of
budgetary slack may have been motivated to justify their behavior in their moral judgment of
10 Alpha Production Company was the name given the hypothetical company in the experimental materials.
11 The statement on the exit questionnaire that we used to capture perceived moral obligation was used as a manipulation
check by Stevens 2002. Consistent with his study using only slack-inducing participants, we find that participants
across both pay schemes agreed with this statement on average. Given theory suggesting that a sense of moral obliga-
tion is required for moral reasoning to arise, however, we use this statement to control for potential individual differ-
ences in perceived moral obligation. It is also important for us to control for this measure of perceived moral obligation
empirically, as it differed marginally by pay scheme in our study see below.
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budgetary slack. We use budgetary slack in the fifth and final production period to capture this
justification effect. Budgetary slack in the final production period is a reasonable measure of this
construct because it reflected all of the participants’ experimental learning and was the closest
production period to the moral judgment in the exit questionnaire. As in Stevens 2002, we
measure budgetary slack as the difference between the subordinate’s expected performance and
chosen budget divided by the subordinate’s expected performance. The average of production in
the prior two periods is used to proxy for the subordinate’s expected performance. Based on prior
results Sligo and Stirton 1998, we predict a negative relation between this control variable and
moral judgments regarding budgetary slack.
RESULTS
Figure 1 presents frequency histograms of participants’ responses to the moral judgment
statement in the exit questionnaire. The histogram for the entire sample is presented in Panel A,
the histogram for the subsample of participants given the slack-inducing pay scheme is presented
in Panel B, and the histogram for the subsample of participants given the truth-inducing pay
scheme is presented in Panel C. The histogram in Panel A reflects wide variance in moral judg-
ments regarding budgetary slack in the full sample. The mean response across all participants is
4.32 Std. Dev. 2.00, which is not significantly different from the neutral response of 4 p  0.11.
The histograms in Panels B and C, however, display a strong differential response based on pay
scheme. The modal response for the slack-inducing subsample in Panel B is 6 and 65 percent of
the responses 34 out of 52 are above the neutral response of 4. In contrast, the modal response
for the truth-inducing subsample in Panel C is 4 and only 35 percent of the responses 18 out of
52 are above the neutral response of 4.
Table 1 presents simple tests of mean differences across pay scheme. Hypothesis 1 predicts
that subordinates who set budgets under a slack-inducing pay scheme will be more likely to judge
significant budgetary slack to be unethical than subordinates who set budgets under a truth-
inducing pay scheme. The first row of Table 1 shows that participants receiving the slack-inducing
pay scheme more strongly agreed that significant budgetary slack was unethical than participants
receiving the truth-inducing pay scheme p  0.01. Interestingly, the mean response of 4.81 for
the slack-inducing group is significantly above the neutral response of 4 p  0.01 whereas the
mean response of 3.83 for the truth-inducing group is not significantly different from the neutral
response of 4 p  0.10. Thus, not only did the truth-inducing pay scheme group exhibit lower
moral judgment, but also the truth-inducing pay scheme group did not judge significant budgetary
slack to be unethical on average. These results support H1.
The second and third rows of Table 1 suggest that the pay scheme effect we document is not
attributable to differences in perceived moral obligation or justification. The second row shows
that the average response to the moral obligation statement of 5.96 for the slack-inducing pay
scheme group was marginally lower than the average response of 6.48 for the truth-inducing group
p  0.06. Both of these average responses, however, are significantly above the “neutral”
response of 4 p  0.01. The marginally lower response for the slack-inducing group suggests
that our pay scheme result is not attributable to the slack-inducing participants perceiving a higher
moral obligation to present a truthful budget. The marginally lower response for the slack-
inducing group may be attributable to the inconsistency between their pay scheme and the expec-
tation of a truthful budget conveyed in the instructions. The third row shows that the average
budgetary slack of 41 percent for the slack-inducing group was significantly higher than the
average budgetary slack of 4 percent for the truth-inducing pay scheme group p  0.01. Thus,
the pay scheme group that judged budgetary slack to be unethical also created the most budgetary
slack, which suggests that our pay scheme result is not attributable to the previously documented
justification effect on moral reasoning O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005.
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FIGURE 1
Moral Judgments Regarding Budgetary Slack in the Total Sample and by Pay Schemea
a Moral Judgment: The response to the following statement in the exit questionnaire: “To have set the budget
significantly below the forecast of production would have been unethical.” The response ranges from 1 =
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (4 = neutral).
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Table 2 presents bivariate correlations for variables in our regression model of Moral Judg-
ment. These bivariate correlations are consistent with our predictions. Pay Scheme coded 0 for the
truth-inducing pay scheme and 1 for the slack-inducing pay scheme is highly positively correlated
with Moral Judgment, consistent with H1. In addition, Traditional Values and Responsibility are
highly positively correlated with Moral Judgment at the 1 percent level. Although a bit more
weakly than the other two personal values, Empathy is also positively correlated with Moral
Judgment at the 5 percent level 10 percent level for the nonparametric Spearman correlation.
These results support H2, H3, and H4, respectively. These bivariate results, however, must be
interpreted with care as they do not control for the presence of other variables in the model.
Interestingly, Responsibility is positively correlated with both Traditional Values and Empathy,
although the latter two personal values are not correlated with each other at traditional levels of
significance.12 Thus, a multivariate analysis appears warranted to separate out incremental effects
of each variable on moral judgments regarding budgetary slack.
Table 3 presents a step-wise regression analysis of moral judgments regarding budgetary
slack. In Model 1, the pay scheme variable Slack-Inducing is included along with the three control
12 One of the major goals behind the formation of the personality scales in the JPI-R was to maximize discrimination
among the scales Jackson 1994, 40. Correlations among the JPI-R personality scales, however, are expected to occur
and differ somewhat by sample. In an analysis of correlations between personality scales by gender, both male and
female samples exhibited similar correlations to what we document. In particular, while there was very little correlation
between the Traditional Values and Empathy scales, the Responsibility scale was positively correlated with both scales
and was more strongly correlated with the Traditional Values scale than the Empathy scale Jackson 1994, 53.
TABLE 1
Simple Tests of Mean Differences across Pay Scheme*
Slack-Inducing
Pay Schemed
Truth-Inducing
Pay Schemee
t-test
(p-value)
Moral Judgmenta 4.81 3.83 2.57
1.93 1.97 0.01
Moral Obligationb 5.96 6.48 1.92
1.72 0.94 0.06
Budgetary Slackc 0.41 0.04 6.90
0.39 0.07 0.01
*Means tests use t-tests for equality of means. Where cell means are presented, the standard deviations are in parentheses.
Where t-tests are presented, the two-tailed probabilities are in parentheses.
a Moral Judgment: The response to the following statement in the exit questionnaire: “To have set the budget significantly
below the forecast of production would have been unethical.” The response ranges from 1  strongly disagree to 7 
strongly agree 4  neutral.
b Moral Obligation: The response to the following statement in the exit questionnaire: “Alpha Production Company would
like its workers to produce as many units as they can and to set their budgets at their forecast of production.” The
response ranges from 1  strongly disagree to 7  strongly agree 4  neutral.
c Budgetary Slack: Budgetary slack in the final period period 5, calculated as the difference between the subordinate’s
expected performance and chosen budget divided by the subordinate’s expected performance. The average of produc-
tion in the prior two periods is used to proxy for the subordinate’s expected performance.
d Slack-Inducing Pay Scheme: The pay scheme under which participants set their budgets was slack-inducing, i.e., Pay 
$1.35  $0.05 AB if A ≥ B, and Pay  $1.35 if A  B, where A Actual Production and B  Budgeted Production.
e Truth-Inducing Pay Scheme: The pay scheme under which participants set their budgets was truth-inducing, i.e., Pay 
$0.10B  $0.05 AB if A ≥ B, and Pay  $0.10B  $0.15 AB if A  B, where A  Actual Production and B 
Budgeted Production.
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TABLE 2
Bivariate Correlations for Variables in the Regression Models of Moral Judgment*
Variable
Moral
Judgment
Pay
Scheme
Trad.
Values Responsibility Empathy
Moral
Obligation
Senior Year in
B-School Justification
Moral Judgmenta 1.00 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.23 0.06 0.17 0.14
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.07 0.15
Pay Schemeb 0.26 1.00 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.04 0.56
0.01 0.25 0.42 0.10 0.06 0.68 0.01
Traditional Valuesc 0.31 0.13 1.00 0.34 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.02
0.01 0.18 0.01 0.10 0.80 0.90 0.87
Responsibilityd 0.26 0.10 0.33 1.00 0.23 0.01 0.07 0.05
0.01 0.34 0.01 0.02 0.90 0.51 0.60
Empathye 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.19 1.00 0.04 0.07 0.07
0.08 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.68 0.50 0.47
Moral Obligationf 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.03 1.00 0.08 0.06
0.54 0.26 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.44 0.55
Senior Year in B-Schoolg 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 1.00 0.02
0.12 0.68 0.85 0.70 0.53 0.70 0.81
Justificationh 0.07 0.60 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.08 1.00
0.52 0.01 0.95 0.83 0.52 0.70 0.40
*Pearson correlation statistics are reported above the diagonal and nonparametric Spearman correlation statistics are reported below the diagonal. Two-tailed p-values are in
parentheses.
a Moral Judgment: The response to the following statement in the exit questionnaire: “To have set the budget significantly below the forecast of production would have been
unethical.” The response ranges from 1  strongly disagree to 7  strongly agree 4  neutral.
b Pay Scheme: Coded as 0 if the participant was paid according to the truth-inducing payment scheme and 1 if the participant was paid according to the slack-inducing payment
scheme.
c Traditional Values: The degree to which an individual incorporates old values, such as honesty, frugality, modesty, respect for authority, and patriotism; measured by the Traditional
Values scale of the JPI-R questionnaire, which ranges from 0 to 20.
d Responsibility: General sensitivity to moral obligations to other people and to society at large measured by the Responsibility scale of the JPI-R questionnaire, which ranges from
0 to 20.
e Empathy: Identifying closely with other people and their problems; measured using the Empathy scale of the JPI-R questionnaire, which ranges from 0 to 20.
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 2 (continued)
f Moral Obligation: The response to the following statement in the exit questionnaire: “Alpha would like its workers to produce as many units as they can and to set their budgets
at their forecast of production.” The response ranges from 1  strongly disagree to 7  strongly agree 4  neutral.
g Senior Year in Business School: Coded as 0 for sophomores 2 and juniors 30 and 1 for seniors 70 and graduate students 2.
h Justification: Measured by budgetary slack created in the final period, calculated as the difference between the subordinate’s expected performance and chosen budget divided by
the subordinate’s expected performance. The average of production in the prior two periods is used to proxy for the subordinate’s expected performance.
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variables. In the following three models, the three personal values are added one at a time in order
of the hypotheses. The probability levels presented in the table reflect one-tailed significance for
our predicted effects. In all four models, the coefficient for the Slack-Inducing variable is positive
and highly statistically significant one-tailed p  0.01. The magnitude of the coefficient in each
model is also economically significant as it suggests that Moral Judgment increased by about two
points on the seven-point Likert scale under the slack-inducing pay scheme relative to the truth-
inducing pay scheme. These results provide strong support for H1.
The coefficient on the variable Traditional Values is positive and highly significant in Model
2 one-tailed p  0.01 and remains highly significant when the other two personal values are
added in Models 3 and 4. Across the three models, the coefficient on Traditional Values remains
stable at about 0.20, suggesting that Moral Judgment increased by about four points on average as
an individual’s score on this personality scale went from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 20.
This result provides strong support for H2. Inconsistent with H3, however, the variable Respon-
sibility is not significant when it is present in Models 3 and 4. This result is likely attributable to
the high correlation between Responsibility and the other two personal values. The variable Em-
TABLE 3
Regression Models of Moral Judgments Regarding Budgetary Slacka
Slack-Inducing and Truth-Inducing Pay Schemes
Moral Judgment01Slack–Inducing2Traditional Values3Responsibility
4Empathy5Moral Obligation6Senior Year in B–School
7Justification
Variable
Predicted
Sign 1 2 3 4
Intercept 4.20*** 1.77* 1.54 0.63
Pay Scheme
Slack-Inducing H1  1.88*** 2.13*** 2.08*** 2.26***
Personal Values
Traditional Values H2  0.22*** 0.21*** 0.20***
Responsibility H3  0.03 0.01
Empathy H4  0.11**
Control Variables
Moral Obligation  0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05
Senior Year in B-School  0.64** 0.65** 0.64** 0.58**
Justification Budgetary Slack  2.42*** 2.59*** 2.53*** 2.61***
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.31 0.31 0.35
Sample Size 104 104 104 104
*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, for predicted effects.
a Moral Judgment: The response to the following statement in the exit questionnaire: “To have set the budget significantly
below the forecast of production would have been unethical.” The response ranges from 1  strongly disagree to 7 
strongly agree 4  neutral.
See Table 2 for definitions of other variables.
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pathy is significantly positive when added in Model 4 one-tailed p  0.05 and the coefficient of
0.11 suggests that Moral Judgment increased by about two points on average as an individual’s
score on this personality scale went from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 20. This result
provides strong support for H4. Interestingly, adding the personal values variables doubles the
explanatory power of the model from an adjusted R2 of 0.17 to 0.35.
The signs of the coefficients on the control variables are consistent with predictions. In
particular, the coefficient on Moral Obligation is consistently positive while the coefficients are
consistently negative for Senior Year in Business School and Justification. The coefficient on
Moral Obligation, however, does not reach significance in any of the models. The low explanatory
power of this control variable, however, may be attributable to its relatively low variability across
participants in the experiment. The negative coefficients on Senior Year in Business School and
Justification are significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, using one-tailed
significance levels. While theory and prior empirical results suggest that these three control vari-
ables should be included in the model of moral judgment regarding budgetary slack, our main
results hold when they are removed from the model.
A main result from this study is that participants only agreed that significant budgetary slack
was unethical on average under the slack-inducing pay scheme. To further investigate this result,
we present in Table 4 we present a regression model of moral judgments regarding budgetary slack
for this pay scheme group alone. In this regression model, the coefficient for the Traditional
Values variable is significantly positive at the 5 percent level one-tailed p  0.05 and the
coefficient for Empathy is highly significantly positive at the 1 percent level one-tailed p  0.01.
The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that under the slack-inducing pay scheme, Moral
Judgment increased by about 2.5 and 3 points on average as an individual’s score went from the
minimum of 0 to the maximum of 20 on the Traditional Values and Empathy scale, respectively.
The Responsibility scale, however, remains insignificant. Thus, the Traditional Values and Empa-
thy effects appear to explain why participants under the slack-inducing pay scheme judge signifi-
cant budgetary slack to be unethical on average.
In summary, our results support three of our four hypotheses. Consistent with H1, we find that
participants who set budgets under a slack-inducing pay scheme were more likely to judge sig-
nificant budgetary slack to be unethical than participants who set budgets under a truth-inducing
pay scheme. In follow-up analyses, we find that this pay scheme result is not attributable to
differences in perceived moral obligation regarding the truthfulness of the budget or to justifica-
tion bias. Consistent with H2, we find that participants who scored high in Traditional Values on
the JPI-R Jackson 1994 were more likely to judge significant budgetary slack to be unethical on
average. Inconsistent with H3, however, we find no explanatory power for the Responsibility scale
of the JPI-R with the other variables in the model. This result is likely attributable to the high
correlation between Responsibility and the other two personal values in the model. Finally, con-
sistent with H4, we find that participants who scored high in Empathy were more likely to judge
significant budgetary slack to be unethical on average. These results hold under alternative regres-
sion models of moral judgment, i.e., with or without our control variables included in the model
and in the slack-inducing pay scheme group alone, which was the only pay scheme group to agree,
on average, that significant budgetary slack was unethical.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study examines moral judgments regarding budgetary slack made by participants at the
end of a participative budgeting experiment in which an expectation for a truthful budget was
present. While early experimental results suggested that moral judgments regarding budgetary
slack are invariant to financial incentives and social settings Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002,
recent experimental results suggest that moral judgments regarding budgetary slack are subject to
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framing effects Rankin et al. 2008; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008. Our results support the fram-
ing view of the moral content of participative budgeting settings. In particular, our results suggest
that financial incentives play a role in determining the moral frame of the budgeting setting and
that personal values determine how individuals respond to that moral frame. Thus, this study
provides new and potentially useful insights regarding the moral content of participative budgeting
settings.
Our pay scheme result, that participants judged significant budgetary slack to be unethical on
average under a slack-inducing pay scheme but not under a truth-inducing pay scheme, suggests
that slack-inducing pay schemes are likely to generate a moral frame by setting economic self-
interest against common social norms for truthfulness and responsibility. By examining the effects
of personal values, we provide evidence regarding determinants of moral reasoning that cause
individuals to respond differently to various moral frames. Holding pay scheme constant, we find
that traditional values and empathy caused participants to increase their moral judgments regard-
ing budgetary slack. In an analysis of the slack-inducing pay scheme group alone, we find that
these two personal values explain the increase in moral judgment under the slack-inducing pay
scheme. Our results are consistent with theory and empirical evidence in moral philosophy and
moral psychology.
TABLE 4
Regression Model of Moral Judgments Regarding Budgetary Slacka
Slack-Inducing Pay Scheme Only
Moral Judgment01Traditional Values2Responsibility
3Empathy4Moral Obligation5Senior Year in B-School
6Justification
Variable
Predicted
Sign
Slack-Inducing Pay Scheme
Only
Intercept 3.50***
Personal Values
Traditional Values  0.12**
Responsibility  0.09
Empathy  0.15***
Control Variables
Moral Obligation  0.14
Senior Year in B-School  0.06
Justification Budgetary Slack  2.91***
Adjusted R2 0.36
Sample size 52
*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, for predicted effects.
a Moral Judgment: The response to the following statement in the exit questionnaire: “To have set the budget significantly
below the forecast of production would have been unethical.” The response ranges from 1  strongly disagree to 7 
strongly agree 4  neutral
See Table 2 for definitions of other variables.
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Our results provide one possible explanation for why truth-inducing pay schemes are rarely
found in practice Kaplan and Atkinson 1998. In particular, our results suggest that such pay
schemes are unnecessary when subordinates have sufficient moral values and an expectation for a
truthful budget is present. Under the slack-inducing pay scheme, participants who scored in the top
quartile of moral judgment averaged a moral judgment score of 6.85 out of 7 and set budgetary
slack at 5.6 percent, on average. This level of budgetary slack is very close to the 4 percent set by
participants in the truth-inducing pay scheme group. In contrast, those who scored in the bottom
quartile of moral judgment averaged a moral judgment score of 2.00 and set budgetary slack at
61.8 percent, on average. A slack-inducing pay scheme may be optimal for other reasons. For
example, researchers have argued that slack-inducing pay schemes allow the superior to use
budgetary slack as a buffer against environmental uncertainty Cyert and March 1992, as a
reward for superior performance Merchant 1989, or as an incentive for increased effort
Schatzberg and Stevens 2008. Other researchers have argued that slack-inducing pay schemes
increase perceptions of trust Libby 2003.
Finally, our results support the argument that morality is an effective and efficient control for
self-interested behavior that should not be ignored by economists and accountants DeGeorge
1992; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010. Future research in this area appears to be warranted. For
example, future research could consider other economic settings besides participative budgeting
that raise moral dilemmas, such as the traditional investment setting where non-owner managers
have an incentive to expropriate the invested funds of owners. Future research could also consider
external factors that affect the response to a given moral dilemma, such as a code of ethics. The
impact of particular personal values on moral reasoning in accounting also appears to be a fertile
area for future research. We find that traditional values and empathy are uncorrelated with each
other, yet they both increase moral reasoning regarding budgetary slack. While traditional values
may be considered to be a less-developed form of moral reasoning than empathy by some moral
theorists, both personal values appear to be important to accounting professionals who bear the
responsibility of enforcing rules and regulations.
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